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NOMOTHESIA IN CLASSICAL ATHENS: WHAT SOURCES
SHOULD WE BELIEVE?
I. SOURCES (AND PROBLEMS) ABOUT NOMOTHESIA
In the fifth century B.C.E. the Athenians did not make any distinction between laws
(nomoi) and decrees (psêphismata). The Assembly passed both kinds of measures in
the same way, and both general enactments and short-term provisions held the same
legal status. At the end of the fifth century, however, the Athenians decided to make
a distinction between the two kinds of measures and created the rule that no decree
would be superior to a law (Andoc. 1.86; Dem. 23.86, 218; 24.18, 59, 116, 188;
46.2).1 The Assembly continued to pass decrees in the same way, but a new body of
nomothetai was created to ratify laws (nomoi). There were also two separate procedures
for rescinding the two kinds of measures: one could bring a graphê paranomôn (a public
action against an illegal decree) against a psêphisma and a graphê ‘nomon mê epitêdeion
theinai’ (a public action against an inexpedient law) against a nomos. This much is clear;
scholars do not agree however about the procedure for passing a new law (nomothesia)
in fourth-century Athens.
The main evidence for the procedure of nomothesia is found in two speeches pre-
served in the Demosthenic corpus, Against Leptines (20) and Against Timocrates
(24). A passage from Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon (3.38–40) discusses the procedure
to be followed for ensuring that there are no contradictions among the laws, but this evi-
dence is not pertinent to the topic of this essay.2 Contemporary inscriptions provide the
following evidence about the procedure of nomothesia.3 First, the motion and the
1 For the difference between laws and decrees in the fourth century see M.H. Hansen, ‘Nomos and
psephisma in fourth-century Athens’, GRBS 19 (1978), 315–30; id., ‘Did the Athenian Ecclesia legis-
late after 403/2 B.C.?’, GRBS 20 (1979), 27–53. See also id., The Athenian Democracy in the Age of
Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology (Oxford, 1991), 161–77, 256–7; P.J. Rhodes,
‘Nomothesia in Classical Athens’, in L’educazione giuridica 5/2 (1987), 5–26; R. Sealey, The
Athenian Republic: Democracy or the Rule of Law? (Philadelphia and London, 1987), 41–5. Note
however that the documents quoted at Andoc. 1.87 (cf. M. Canevaro and E.M. Harris, ‘The documents
in Andocides’ On the Mysteries’, CQ 62 [2012], 98–129) and Dem. 24.59 are forgeries.
2 What is not clear is the relationship between this passage and the ad hoc commissioners elected
by the people to remove contradictory laws mentioned in Dem. 20.91. D.M. MacDowell,
‘Law-making at Athens in the fourth century B.C.’, JHS 95 (1975), 62–74, at 72 and P.J. Rhodes,
‘Nomothesia in fourth-century Athens’, CQ 35 (1984), 55–60, at 60 think that the thesmothetai at
some point were put in charge of the procedure instead of the commissioners. M.H. Hansen,
‘Athenian nomothesia’, GRBS 26 (1985), 345–71, at 356 thinks that thesmothetai and commissioners
worked together.
3 In chronological order SEG 26.72; R.S. Stroud, The Athenian Grain-Tax Law of 374/3 B.C.
Hesperia Supplement 29 (Princeton, 1998); Agora Excavations, inv. no. I 7495 (unpublished);
IG II2 140; IG II2 244; SEG 12.87; IG II2 334 + SEG 18.13; IG II2 333; SEG 35.83. Cf. also the regu-
lations for the Mysteries at Eleusis in a fourth-century inscription (K. Clinton, Eleusis: The
Inscriptions on Stone. Documents of the Sanctuary of the Two Goddesses and Public Documents
of the Deme. Vol. IA: Text [Athens, 2005], no. 138 and Vol. II: Commentary [Athens, 2008], at 116).
Classical Quarterly 63.1 139–160 (2013) Printed in Great Britain 139
doi:10.1017/S0009838812000560
enactment formulas for a law are usually ‘be it resolved by the nomothetai’ and ‘the
nomothetai have resolved’ (δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις or ἔδοξɛ τοῖς νομοθέταις)4
and does not mention the Council or the Assembly.5 Decisions of the Council sub-
sequently passed by the Assembly mention both (δεδόχθαι τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι
δήμωι, or a probouleumatic formula requiring that the proposal be submitted to the
Assembly). The formula δεδόχθαι τῆι βουλῆι is consistently used for decisions of
the Council that do not need any further approval by the Assembly.6 By analogy, the
decisions of the nomothetai, since the Assembly is never mentioned, must be final.7
Second, the prescripts of the nomoi preserved in contemporary inscriptions indicate
that they were passed not at one time of the year but at different dates throughout the
year.8 Sessions of the nomothetai could therefore be summoned at any time during
the year, and laws could be passed in any prytany. Third, three decrees of the
Assembly order that a proposal be submitted to the nomothetai.9 One of them, IG
VII 4254 (lines 39–40), employs the expression ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις νομοθέταις, which
implies that minor legislation did not require a session of specially appointed nomothe-
tai, but could wait for the first one available.
This essay examines the information concerning nomothesia found in the
Demosthenic speeches Against Leptines and Against Timocrates, which were delivered
between 355 and 35310 at trials involving the public action against inexpedient laws
(γραφαὶ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον θɛῖναι). The speakers in each case discuss the laws
about nomothesia and ask the clerk to read the relevant statutes to the court. In
Against Leptines Demosthenes (20.92) asks for a single law about nomothesia to be
read out, then discusses its contents, which concern the procedure for enacting new
laws. The manuscripts of the speech do not however preserve a text of this law. In
Against Timocrates there is a discussion of the procedures for enacting new laws
(Dem. 24.18–36), and two documents are inserted into the text at Dem. 24.20–3 and
33. The information about nomothesia found in Against Leptines does not however
agree with the provisions contained in the documents preserved in Against
Timocrates. As a result, there has been much debate about the procedure in the past
4 δɛδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις is found in Agora Inv. 7495 (unpublished, see S. Alessandrì, ‘Alcune
osservazioni sui segretari ateniesi nel IV sec. a.C.’, AnnPisa 12 [1982], 7–70, at 7–11), IG II2 140,
IG II2 244, SEG 12.87, SEG 35.83, IG II2 334 + SEG 18.13. SEG 26.72 has ἔδοξɛ τοῖς νομοθέταις.
5 The only exception is Stroud (n. 3), which mentions neither the nomothetai nor the Assembly nor
the Council. Also, in IG II2 333 νομο[θɛτῶν ἕδρα] has been restored by Foucart, but S. Lambert,
‘Athenian state laws and decrees, 352/1–322/1: II. Religious regulations’, ZPE 154 (2005),
125–59, at 140 restores νόμο[ς πɛρὶ τῆς ἐξɛτάσɛως τῶν, which is likely to be correct.
6 Cf. P.J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford, 1972), 82–7, 271–5.
7 Cf.MacDowell (n. 2), 63. Pace K.M.T. Atkinson, ‘Athenian legislative procedure and revision of
laws’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 23 (1939), 107–150, at 113.
8 IG II2 333 is enacted on Skirophorion 8, SEG 12.87 in the ninth prytany, IG II2 140 in the fifth,
the seventh or the tenth prytany.
9 IG II2 222, IG II2 330 and IG VII 4254.
10 Cf. Dion. Hal. Amm. 1.4. The reliability of Dionysius’ dates is not beyond suspicion and there
has been some debate about the exact dates of these two trials. Cf. R. Sealey, ‘Dionysius of
Halicarnassus and some Demosthenic dates’, REG 68 (1955), 77–120; G. Cawkwell, ‘Notes on the
Social War’, C&M 23 (1962), 34–40: they accept Dionysius’ dates. D.M. Lewis, ‘Notes on Attic
inscriptions (XIII)’, BSA 49 (1954), 17–50 at 32, 43–7 and Selected Papers in Greek and Near
Eastern History, ed. P.J. Rhodes (Cambridge, 1997), 230–51 (and R. Lane Fox, ‘Demosthenes,
Dionysius and the dating of six early speeches’, C&M 48 [1997], 167–203, who does not however
analyse the dates of these speeches) are more sceptical about Dionysius’ reliability. Exact dating is
not however necessary here, and the internal evidence of the speeches confirms that Dionysius’
dates are approximately right.
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thirty-five years, and several scholars have offered different reconstructions of the pro-
cedure and its evolution.
MacDowell11 has identified no fewer than five different procedures. One of these
procedures was concerned with enacting new laws (Dem. 20.92) and replaced an
older procedure (Dem. 20.89–91, 93–4). The other procedures are described in
Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon (3.38–40) and in the two documents of Demosthenes’
Against Timocrates (24.20–3 and 33), the second being again a procedure laid down
later in the fourth century. His reconstruction encounters several objections. In particu-
lar, Demosthenes at 20.91–2 does not seem to discuss an actual law; he is only describ-
ing how bad politicians break the law. More importantly, if MacDowell were correct in
his chronology of the different procedures, there would have simultaneously been two
different panels of nomothetai in the middle of the fourth century, one, attested by
the document at Dem. 24.20–3, appointed from those who had sworn the Heliastic
Oath and another panel appointed from all Athenians (Dem. 20.92), both performing
exactly the same functions. One of the two sources must be mistaken.12 Furthermore,
if MacDowell’s chronology is right, Demosthenes (20.92) would be claiming that a
law which had been repealed many years before was still valid.
Rhodes followed MacDowell in his belief that nomothesia went through several
stages in the early fourth century but offered a different reconstruction.13 Rhodes
believes that Dem. 20.89–94 refers to the procedures found in documents inserted at
Dem. 24.20–3 and 33. The latter was originally a rider to the former but gradually
became an independent statute. During this time the law at Dem. 24.20–3, which
required that new legislation could only be enacted in Hekatombaion, was forgotten.
As a result, politicians started enacting laws at any point during the year. At both trials
Demosthenes was attempting to restore the correct practice. This reconstruction is
implausible: first, the law described at Dem. 20.89–94 does not correspond to the pro-
cedures described in the documents found in Against Timocrates. The law at Dem.
20.89–94 concerns the procedure for enacting new legislation; the two documents in
Against Timocrates concern a general confirmation of the law code and the procedure
for repealing laws. Nor do the individual provisions match, and the documents in
Against Timocrates do not lay down the procedure for the public action against an inex-
pedient law. If both sources are reliable, they can hardly refer to the same procedure.
And yet if they do, we would have multiple overlapping procedures, enacted at the
same time, whose purpose is roughly the same, legislation. Rhodes also believes, relying
on the document at Dem. 24.20–3, that early in the fourth century legislation could only
be enacted at the beginning of the year and only to replace existing statutes repealed on
11 Hekatombaion. This is implausible because it would have made it impossible for the
Athenians to enact necessary legislation during the rest of the year (e.g. ad hoc changes
of the merismos for the purpose of funding a festival or a grant of honours like those
prescribed in IG II2 222, IG II2 330 and IG VII 4254 would not have been possible).
It is on the other hand implausible that the Athenians would have ignored a valid
law, if it actually contained a provision on such an important issue, for several years
before Demosthenes brought the violation to everyone’s attention.
11 MacDowell (n. 2).
12 Cf. Rhodes (n. 2), 56.
13 P.J. Rhodes, ‘Athenian democracy after 403 B.C.’, CJ 75 (1980), 305–23, at 305–6.
NOMOTHESIA IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 141
Hansen reduces the procedures to three.14 The first procedure is described in the
document found at Dem. 24.20–3, the second in the document found at Dem. 24.33
(which Hansen believes is the same procedure which is discussed at Dem. 20.89–94)
and the third at Aeschin. 3.38–40 (a procedure for removing contradictory laws).
According to Hansen, the first two procedures existed simultaneously and were used
to appoint nomothetai. On this reconstruction the law at Dem. 24.20–3 provides a pro-
cedure to modify, repeal or introduce new laws starting at a meeting of the Assembly to
be held on 11 Hekatombaion and ending with a decision of the nomothetai. The pro-
cedure in the document at Dem. 24.33 would lead to the same outcome, but through
a procedure which could be initiated at any time of the year. This reconstruction also
meets with several objections. First, the document found at Dem. 24.33 does not corre-
spond to the description of the procedure discussed at Dem. 20.89–94. Many provisions
mentioned in the latter are missing in the document (like the requirement to post the new
laws before the Eponymous Heroes). Hansen tries to evade this objection by claiming
that the document at Dem. 24.33 is incomplete and that the complete document
would have contained the missing provisions. Yet many of these missing provisions
are in fact found in the document at Dem. 24.20–3; it would have been perverse for
the Athenians to enact two different laws at the same time for the same purpose and
with almost identical contents. Finally, it strains credibility to believe that in Against
Leptines Demosthenes (20.89–94) describes a statute about repealing existing laws
(document at Dem. 24.33) as one about enacting new laws.15 These sources, if they
refer to the same statutes, contradict each other.
All these reconstructions contain implausible hypotheses, and none of them accounts
for all the evidence and is therefore clearly superior to the others. The reason why none
of these reconstructions has been successful is that the evidence they attempt to explain
is itself contradictory. The solution to the problem is to start by recognizing that the
documents at Dem. 24.20–3 and 33 are not authentic. Many scholars in the nineteenth
century regarded these documents are forgeries,16 and the stichometry of the Against
Timocrates reveals that they were not in the Urexemplar of the speech but were
added later.17 At the end of the nineteenth century Schöll and Drerup argued that
they were genuine documents, and their authenticity has not been questioned since
then.18 The conclusions of Schöll and Drerup rest however on their reconstructions
of the nomothesia procedure. Since their reconstructions have been abandoned,19
14 M.H. Hansen, ‘Athenian nomothesia in the fourth century BC and Demosthenes’ speech
against Leptines’, C&M 32 (1979–80), 87–104 and id. (n. 2).
15 Even though the statute could be interpreted as allowing enacting new laws to replace old ones,
one cannot deny that the wording of the document at Dem. 24.33 makes clear that the topic is repeal-
ing old laws. See below pp. 156–8.
16 Cf. A. Westermann, Untersuchungen über die in die attischen Redner eingelegten Urkunden.
Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften. Phil. Hist. Klasse (Leipzig, 1850);
G.E. Benseler, Demosthenes. Reden gegen Androtion und Timocrates (Leipzig, 1861); W. Wayte,
Demosthenes. Against Androtion and Against Timocrates (Cambridge, 1882), passim.
17 F. Burger, Stichometrische Untersuchungen zu Demosthenes und Herodot: ein Beitrag zur
Kenntnis des antiken Buchwesens (Munich, 1892), 14.
18 R. Schöll, ‘Ueber attische Gesetzgebung’, SBAW (1886), 83–139; E. Drerup, ‘Über die bei den
attischen Rednern eingelegten Urkunden’, Jahrbücher für classische Philologie. Supplementband
24.2 (1898), 221–366, at 248–63.
19 The reconstructions found in MacDowell (n. 2), Rhodes (n. 2) and Hansen (n. 14 and n. 2) have
really nothing to do with Drerup’s and Schöll’s attempts to understand Athenian nomothesia.
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their defence of the documents must also be called into question. It is time to take a fresh
look at the documents.20
This essay begins by analysing the summaries of the laws about nomothesia found
in Against Timocrates and Against Leptines and shows that they are consistent with
each other and provide a reliable account of the procedure (§ II). Section III then com-
pares this account with the information found in the documents inserted at Dem.
24.20–3 and 33 and shows that they contain internal contradictions and language
that is inconsistent with the terminology used in Athenian official documents during
the fourth century B.C.E.
II. DEMOSTHENES ON NOMOTHESIA: A RECONSTRUCTION
In the Against Timocrates Demosthenes (24.17) starts the main part of his legal case by
saying that he wishes first to explain the statutes which Timocrates has violated in pas-
sing his law.21 He claims that the laws are clear about the procedures to be followed
when enacting a new law (πɛρὶ τῶν μɛλλόντων τɛθήσɛσθαι νόμων). At 18 he states
that first (πρῶτον) there is a time (χρόνος) during which one must legislate
(νομοθɛτɛῖν). Then (ɛἶτα), even at that time (τότɛ) one is not allowed to legislate as
one pleases but must first place a copy of one’s proposed law in front of the monument
of the Eponymous Heroes for everyone to see (σκοπɛῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ). Next (μɛτὰ
ταῦτα), the proposed law must be the same for all citizens, and in addition to all this
(πρὸς τούτοις) all opposing laws must be repealed (λύɛιν τοὺς ἐναντίους).
Demosthenes mentions the fact that the laws contain other provisions that are not rel-
evant for his case. Finally he states that if the proposer of legislation fails to follow
any of these provisions, any Athenian who wishes is allowed to bring a public charge
against him (τῷ βουλομένῳ δίδωσι γράϕɛσθαι). The provisions listed are linked by con-
nectives like πρῶτον, ɛἶτα, μɛτὰ ταῦτα, πρὸς τούτοις, whose exact meaning is here
unclear. Some of the provisions describe the procedure to be followed when enacting
new laws; others contain rules about the substance of new laws. There is no need to
think that Demosthenes follows the order of the provisions found in the actual statute.
He has more likely selected only those provisions relevant to his case and placed them in
an order determined by the sequence of his arguments.
At § 19 Demosthenes accuses Timocrates of violating every provision listed so far.
He will start with the fact that Timocrates enacted his law in defiance of all the laws
(παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους ἐνομοθέτɛι), and afterwards he will deal with his other
offences. Then he asks the grammateus to take and read the relevant laws (in the plural:
καί μοι λαβὲ τουτουσὶ τοὺς νόμους). Demosthenes’ legal discussion follows this
arrangement: it starts with a section about the procedural violations committed by
Timocrates (§§ 24–32), then discusses the rule requiring the repeal of any law with
clauses contradicting the new law to be enacted (§§ 34–9). Finally, after the law of
Timocrates is read out, Demosthenes lists the opposing laws which should have been
20 For a full discussion of my methodology for assessing the authenticity of such documents see
M. Canevaro, ‘The decree awarding citizenship to the Plataeans ([Dem.] 59.104)’, GRBS 50
(2010), 337–69; Canevaro and Harris (n. 1), 98–100.
21 I accept the Demosthenic authorship of the speech and I refer to Demosthenes as the author,
although I am aware that Diodorus pronounced it in court. Cf. Dem. 24.6–16 with D.M.
MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator (Oxford, 2009), 181–5.
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repealed but were not (§§ 39–67). In this last section we find the statute ordering that a
law must be the same for all the Athenians (§ 59).22
Demosthenes’ account continues at § 24, where he starts to discuss the law just read
by the grammateus. After a general praise of the statute, at § 25 he states that first
(πρῶτον) there must be a διαχɛιροτονία on whether a new law is to be proposed
(πότɛρον ɛἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινός) or the laws in force are considered sufficient.
This vote must be held ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν, which must be interpreted here as ‘in the Assembly’,
since the stage at which the nomothetai are summoned is still to come, and the word
διαχɛιροτονία is never used in Athenian sources for a vote by judges in court.23
After this stage (μɛτὰ ταῦτα), if the Assembly votes that proposals for new legislation
can be introduced (ἂν χɛιροτονῆτ’ ɛἰσϕέρɛιν), it is however not permitted for anyone to
enact new statutes immediately (οὐκ ɛὐθὺς τιθέναι προσέταξαν). The law orders that
the appointment of the nomothetai be discussed at the third meeting of the Assembly
(and does not allow legislation to be enacted at that time either). In the interval between
the two meetings whoever wants to propose a new law must post it before the monument
of the Eponymous Heroes for everyone to read (τοῖς βουλομένοις ɛἰσφέρɛιν ἐκτιθέναι
τοὺς νόμους πρόσθɛν τῶν ἐπωνύμων).
Up to this point the procedure prescribed by the law asked to be read out at § 20 is
quite clear. To present new laws a vote on whether new legislation can be proposed must
be held in the Assembly. If the decision is positive, copies of the proposals must be
placed before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes. At the third Assembly the
method for appointing nomothetai must be discussed, and, presumably, a decree of
appointment must be passed. In my discussion I have consistently used the plural,
speaking of ‘proposals’ for ‘new laws’. That the preliminary vote must have been a gen-
eral vote, allowing, if positive, to propose laws in general, is clear from the clause τοῖς
βουλομένοις ɛἰσφέρɛιν ἐκτιθέναι τοὺς νόμους. This inference is confirmed by IG VII
4254, lines 39–40: the Assembly prescribes in a decree that the prytaneis submit a piece
of legislation ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις νομοθέταις, in the first available meeting of the nomothe-
tai. As soon as the procedure for new legislation was begun after a preliminary vote, one
had to submit a proposal to the nomothetai on behalf of the Assembly, but there did not
have to be another preliminary vote for that proposal. This implies that the preliminary
vote, if positive, would have allowed several proposals to be made, and was therefore a
general invitation to submit proposals.
What Demosthenes says about nomothesia up to this point is sufficiently clear. It is
equally important to pay attention to what Demosthenes does not say in this section. At
§ 26 Demosthenes lists the violations committed by Timocrates: he did not place a copy
of his proposal before the Eponymous Heroes and did not therefore give the Athenians a
chance to read it. Most important, he did not observe the times prescribed in the laws
(οὔτ’ ἀνέμɛινɛν οὐδένα τῶν τɛταγμένων χρόνων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις): ‘the meeting of
the Assembly at which you voted on the laws being on 11 Hekatombaion (ἐν ᾗ τοὺς
νόμους ἐπɛχɛιροτονήσατɛ, οὔσης ἑνδɛκάτῃ τοῦ ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνός), he proposed
his law on the 12th of the same month’.
22 The document inserted at that point is not authentic. Cf. Canevaro and Harris (n. 1), 117–19.
23 Cf. E.S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (London, 1972), 84–5; MacDowell
(n. 2), 70; M.H. Hansen, ‘How did the Athenian ecclesia vote?’, GRBS 18 (1977), 123–37, at 124;
id. (n. 14), 93–4; P.J. Rhodes, ‘Sessions of nomothetai in fourth-century Athens’, CQ 53 (2003),
124–9, at 126–7.
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What about the specific clause ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νόμους ἐπɛχɛιροτονήσατɛ at § 26? The key
to understanding this clause is the meaning of ἐπιχɛιροτονɛῖν. Scholars, under the influ-
ence of the document at §§ 20–3, have always interpreted this sentence as referring to an
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων, a general approval (confirmation) of all the laws to be held
every year on the 11th of the first prytany. However such an interpretation would imply
that Demosthenes is alluding here in passing to a general, annual vote on the laws, the
key element of the procedure he is commenting on, after having ignored it all through
his account. I believe the verb should be interpreted in a less specific way as ‘to put a
matter to the vote’ and refers to the διαχɛιροτονία described at § 24.
In the Demosthenic corpus the verb, or the substantive ἐπιχɛιροτονία, occurs ten
times (excluding our case): it occurs twice in spurious documents of On the Crown
(Dem. 18.29 and 105), which cannot be used to determine its meaning. Moreover,
six other occurrences are in Demosthenes’ Against Timocrates. The First Philippic
(Dem. 4) and the speech Against Theocrines ([Dem.] 58) yield one each. Three of
the occurrences of ἐπιχɛιροτονɛῖν (or ἐπιχɛιροτονία) are in the document at Dem.
24.20–3. The remaining three occurrences in the Against Timocrates refer to different
contexts. At § 39 the verb is used in the document reporting the law of Timocrates,
and its wording is confirmed by § 84: the law prescribes that τοὺς δὲ προέδρους
ἐπιχɛιροτονɛῖν ἐπάναγκɛς, ὅταν τις καθιστάναι βούληται sureties for their debt.
The meaning in this context is clearly the etymological one: to put a particular matter
to the vote, in this case the acceptance of sureties.24 At § 50 the word ἐπιχɛιροτονία
is used in a document that purports to be a law about supplication to the Council or
the Assembly on behalf of a debtor. The proedroi shall not allow an ἐπιχɛιροτονία
before the debtor has paid his debt. Whether authentic or not,25 this document uses
the word, again, with the simple etymological meaning ‘a vote on’ a matter.
Particularly useful is the usage of the verb at Dem. 4.30: ἐπɛιδὰν δ᾽ ἐπιχɛιροτονῆτɛ
τὰς γνώμας, ἂν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ, χɛιροτονήσɛτɛ. In this passage the action of ‘putting pro-
posals to vote’ is followed by the approval (χɛιροτονήσɛτɛ) of one of them. As G.A.
Davies rightly pointed out, ‘there is no sound support for Liddell and Scott’s rendering
“sanction by vote”: also τὰς γνώμας means “all the proposals before you”, i.e. my own
and others which may be made; and they cannot all be sanctioned’.26 This particular
meaning is the essential one, and is found also in the Constitution of the Athenians.
At § 43.5 we read that in the sixth prytany the prytaneis put to the vote whether
there shall be an ostracism or not (ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἕκτης πρυτανɛίας … πɛρὶ τῆς
ὀστρακοφορίας ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν διδόασιν, ɛἰ δοκɛῖ ποιɛῖν ἢ μή). At § 37.1 the Thirty
present two laws to the Council and order them to be put to the vote (νόμους
ɛἰσήνɛγκαν ɛἰς τὴν βουλὴν δύο κɛλɛύοντɛς ἐπιχɛιροτονɛῖν).27 Rhodes singles out a
24 Cf. P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981), 452, pace
LSJ s.v. ἐπιχɛιροτονέω 2.
25 The stichometry of the manuscript does not allow one to decide whether the document was part
of the Urexemplar or not. See Burger (n. 17), 14.
26 G.A. Davies, Demosthenes: Philippics I, II, III with Introduction and Notes (Cambridge, 1949),
ad loc.
27 Rhodes (n. 24), 452 singles out here a specific meaning ‘vote in approval of’. K. von Fritz and
E. Kapp, Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens and Related Texts, The Hafner Library of Classics, 13
(New York, 1950), 183 stick to the more generic meaning ‘put the matter to vote’. I believe with
Rhodes that the context makes clear that the two laws had to be approved; yet I do not think that
we need to postulate a further technical meaning here. The passage simply says that the Thirty ordered
the Council to put a vote on the two laws. That the outcome of the vote could not be anything other
than approval is implied.
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more specialized use of the verb (and of the connected substantive) meaning ‘to confirm
a decision already taken’.28 The verb is used in this sense in regard to a particular vote
held in every kuria Assembly on whether the magistrates are satisfactorily performing
their duties or not. This vote is mentioned in Ath. Pol. 43.4, 61.2 and 61.4 and
[Dem.] 58.27. However, it is clear that such a specialized meaning is secondary, and
derived from the primary ‘to put a matter to the vote’. Ath. Pol. 55.4 makes this passage
clear: the dokimasia of the nine archons is held in front of the Council, and then in a
tribunal. The procedure leads to an ἐπιχɛιροτονία in the Council, and to a ψῆϕος in
the tribunal (δίδωσιν ἐν μὲν τῇ βουλῇ τὴν ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τὴν
ψῆϕον). Although the vote in the Council is technically speaking a vote of confidence
(a ‘confirmation of a decision already taken’), it is apparent that the reason for its name,
whatever specialized meaning one wants to attribute to the word ἐπιχɛιροτονία, is that it
is a ‘vote on’ the archons held by raising of hands. The main meaning of ἐπιχɛιροτονɛῖν
is simply ‘to put a matter to the vote.’29
Now, nothing in Demosthenes’ account of the law on nomothesia points to any other
meaning for ἐπιχɛιροτονɛῖν than ‘put a matter to the vote’. At Dem. 24.24 he describes,
as we have seen, a διαχɛιροτονία on whether new laws can be proposed or not. After
the vote, if positive, anyone could present proposals for new laws. The vote is on
πότɛρον ɛἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινός, whether a new law can be proposed, and not
a vote of approval of the ‘code’ of Athenian laws. The διαχɛιροτονία was held in
two stages, at which voting by raising of hands followed each one of two questions:
the first question was probably ‘Who thinks that a new law is to be brought in
(ɛἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινός)?’30 The second was therefore ‘Who thinks that the
existing laws are sufficient (ἀρκɛῖν οἱ κɛίμɛνοι [νόμοι])?’ This has nothing to do
with a vote of approval of the ‘code’ of law. A parallel for such a preliminary vote
allowing proposals is provided by the law on adeia discussed at §§ 45–6 of this speech:
no proposal is allowed about the condition of atimoi and debtors of the public treasury
unless a preliminary vote (with a quorum of six thousand) in the Assembly grants adeia
to consider such matters.
The obvious reading of ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νόμους ἐπɛχɛιροτονήσατɛ at § 26 is therefore ‘at
which you voted on the laws’ (plural), meaning ‘on whether laws can be proposed’.
Basically the same concept (in a different context) is expressed at Ath. Pol. 43.5 with
πɛρὶ τῆς ὀστρακοφορίας ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν διδόασιν, ɛἰ δοκɛῖ ποιɛῖν ἢ μή. The verb
ἐπɛχɛιροτονήσατɛ is only a brief way of describing the entire process described at
§ 24, and is not referring to a general vote of confidence on the ‘code’ of laws. This
meaning is found in our sources only in connection with the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν
ἀρχῶν, and even in that case it is subordinated to the primary, generic meaning of ‘put-
ting the conduct of the magistrates to the vote’. Demosthenes here only refers, again, to
a preliminary vote about whether to allow proposals of new laws.
The last issue to discuss in relation to Demosthenes’ account of the text read out at
§ 20 are the ‘times prescribed by the laws’ (§ 26 τɛταγμένων χρόνων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις)
that Timocrates has not respected. ‘Times’ had already been mentioned at § 18. At § 26
Demosthenes, as we have seen, lists the infractions committed by Timocrates. He does
not discuss here other provisions of the law; he just lists which provisions Timocrates
28 Rhodes (n. 24), 452, 523, 619, 682, 686.
29 The verb (or the connected substantive) appears thrice in Athenian inscriptions: in IG II2 24, SEG
21.528 and 41.51.
30 Cf. Hansen (n. 23), 124; id. (n. 14), 94 n. 5; id. (n. 2), 365–8; Rhodes (n. 24), 126–7.
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has not respected, and then tells the judges what he has done instead. Every violation in
the list corresponds to one of the clauses in the law presented at § 25: the bills must be
published before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes for everybody to see and
make up their mind, while Timocrates has neither published his proposal nor allowed
the Athenians the chance to consider it. Moreover he did not respect the ‘times’ pre-
scribed by the law. Demosthenes is here alluding, again in passing, to something he
has already discussed: after the preliminary vote the appointment of nomothetai must
be discussed in the third Assembly (§ 25 τὴν τρίτην ἀπέδɛιξαν ἐκκλησίαν). These
are the τɛταγμένοι χρόνοι Demosthenes is alluding to. In fact, he proceeds to show
how Timocrates infringed this provision: the preliminary vote was held on the 11th
of Hekatombaion, and Timocrates enacted his law on the 12th of the same month, with-
out waiting for the third Assembly to discuss the appointment of the nomothetai. The
ἀλλά in the middle of the sentence, creating a strong opposition between the
τɛταγμένοι χρόνοι and Timocrates’s behaviour, grants this. Therefore, Demosthenes
is not alluding here to a provision of the law on nomothesia setting a compulsory vote
on the 11th of Hekatombaion. At § 28 Demosthenes emphasizes again that Timocrates’
offence was to propose that his law be enacted on the next day (ἔγραψɛν αὔριον
νομοθɛτɛῖν). Demosthenes never states nor implies that there was a requirement to hold
a vote about the laws on the 11th of Hekatombaion. If there was to be such a vote, he
would have listed it with the other provisions at § 25. Nothing in Demosthenes’ account
of nomothesia in this section is inconsistent with the epigraphic evidence, which shows
that one could initiate the nomothesia procedure at any time of the year.
I will now discuss Demosthenes’ account of the law read out at § 33, and I will then
compare my provisional results with the discussion of nomothesia in the Against
Leptines. After listing Timocrates’ infractions the grammateus reads out (§ 27) a decree
summoning the nomothetai the day immediately after the preliminary vote, with the
excuse of the arrangements for the Panathenaea.31 The discussion of the procedural
infractions committed by Timocrates carries on to § 31. At § 32 Demosthenes closes
this part of his discussion and introduces a new topic, already anticipated at § 18:
Timocrates enacted a law that violates many other statutes. This, Demosthenes antici-
pates, is illegal because a law prescribes that nobody can present new laws contrary
to existing ones. If one does, a public action can be brought against the proposer
(ἀνάγνωθι δέ μοι λαβὼν τουτονὶ πρῶτον τὸν νόμον, ὃς διαρρήδην οὐκ ἐᾷ νόμον
οὐδέν’ ἐναντίον ɛἰσφέρɛιν, ἐὰν δέ τις ɛἰσφέρῃ, γράφɛσθαι κɛλɛύɛι).32 What is the
relationship between this law and the one discussed at §§ 24–6? This law is described
by Demosthenes as new and different from the previous one (τουτονὶ πρῶτον τὸν
νόμον). However, a law such as the one summarized here obviously concerns legis-
lation, and defines what the previous one ignored: it states what a new law cannot con-
tain, and provides a procedure to bring against new laws that do not respect its
31 This decree has been recently shown to be a forgery by M. Piérart, ‘Qui étaient les nomothètes à
l’époque de Démosthène?’, in E. Levy (ed.), La Codification des lois dans l’antiquité (Paris, 2000),
229–56, at 245–50. Rhodes (n. 23), 125 n. 8 accepts Piérart’s account.
32 I translate here κɛλɛύɛι with ‘authorizes’ since the verb in similar contexts does not mean
‘orders’ but simply ‘provides for it’. Athens did not know compulsory prosecution for any crime.
Cf. Dem. 29.9 with D.M. MacDowell, ‘The authenticity of Demosthenes 29 (Against Aphobos III)
as a source of information about Athenian law’, in Symposion 1985, ed. G. Thür (Cologne, 1989),
253–73, at 257–72 and MacDowell (n. 21), 46–7. See also E.M. Harris, Democracy and the Rule
of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society, and Politics (Cambridge, 2006), 131 for another
example.
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provisions. Hansen rightly points out that ‘nomos can mean anything from one line of a
law to complete legislation’, and adduces as evidence of this the case of the Against
Aristocrates, where at §§ 37 and 60 Demosthenes discusses as different laws two
texts that are found in the same inscription as part of a single statute (IG I3 104.26–
9, 37–8).33 Therefore the law read out by the grammateus at § 33 of the Against
Timocrates is likely to be a further section of the legislation on nomothesia. The law
one would expect to find here would be one prohibiting anyone from proposing a
law that contradicts an existing one and providing public actions against an inexpedient
law if such a law is enacted by the nomothetai.
The account of the law at § 34 is consistent with what has been anticipated at § 32:
Demosthenes again clearly states that one cannot pass a law contradicting other statutes.
Demosthenes adds that if anyone proposes such a law, he must repeal the opposing laws
before enacting the new one (οὐκ ἐᾷ τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι νόμοις ἐναντίον ɛἰσϕέρɛιν, ἐὰν μὴ
λύσῃ τὸν πρότɛρον κɛίμɛνον). Demosthenes proceeds to explain the rationale behind this
rule: this provision is necessary in order to let the judges cast a righteous vote (πρῶτον
μὲν ἵν’ ὑμῖν ἐξῇ τὰ δίκαια ψηφίζɛσθαι μɛτ’ ɛὐσɛβɛίας). In fact, if there were laws con-
tradicting each other, the judges would not be able to make decisions and would be
forced to violate their pledge in the judicial oath to vote according to the laws because
they would have to follow one law and not follow another law (§ 35).34 The lawgiver
enacted such rules in order to protect the judges against this hypothetical situation.
The law just read out therefore prescribes that no law contradicting existing statutes
can be proposed, unless these statutes are repealed. If anybody fails to follow these pro-
visions, anyone can accuse him through a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον θɛῖναι.
Demosthenes also states here (καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ) that the lawgiver enacted such
provisions in order to make ‘you’ guardians of the laws (βουλόμɛνος φύλακας ὑμᾶς
τῶν νόμων καταστῆσαι). The word ὑμᾶς in forensic speeches can refer to the judges
only, or to the entire citizen body. Because he is describing how difficult it is to render
verdicts according to the oath, it is clear that here ὑμᾶς refers explicitly to the judges,
those among the Athenians who swore the annual Heliastic Oath. However
Demosthenes in the following passage at §§ 37–8 seems to extend this claim to the
people of Athens as a whole: he lists many different safeguards of the laws, claiming
that none of them is in itself sufficient and concludes with: τίς οὖν μόνη φυλακὴ καὶ
δικαία καὶ βέβαιος τῶν νόμων; ὑμɛῖς οἱ πολλοί.
In this section Demosthenes, following his claim that his audience are the real guar-
dians of the laws, provides, as we have seen, a list of ‘insufficient’ safeguards.
Demosthenes here is no longer summarizing the provisions of the law read out at
§ 33. He is just singling out all the mechanisms of control deployed throughout the pro-
cedure of nomothesia, to reveal their weaknesses. There is no need therefore to attribute
all these mechanisms to the law at § 33.35 Two of the mechanisms discussed here have
already been mentioned: the provision for publication of the bills before the monument
of the Eponymous Heroes has been mentioned at § 25 and must have been contained in
the law read out at § 20. The provision granting everybody the right to bring a γραφὴ
νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον θɛῖναι is mentioned at § 32 and must have been the final provision
of the law read out at § 33, and possibly the last of the provisions on nomothesia,
33 Hansen (n. 2), 359.
34 See on the judicial oath E.M. Harris, ‘The rule of law in Athenian democracy. Reflections on the
judicial oath’, Dike 8 (2008), 157–81.
35 Pace Hansen (n. 2), 348.
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granting a way to prosecute whoever infringes any of the rules previously stated.
Demosthenes however mentions here a further safeguard: the election of sunêgoroi
(τοὺς συνηγόρους, οὓς χɛιροτονɛῖτɛ).36 He does not give many details about their
role, and simply points out that they might be ineffective, since somebody could con-
vince them to stay silent. We can assume however that such sunêgoroi must have
been elected to speak in defence of the opposing laws that would have been repealed
before the enactment of a new one. There is in fact no need for elected sunêgoroi speak-
ing for the new law, since the proposer himself would have argued his case in person.
Such a function is consistent with the role of the four sundikoi elected (ᾕρηνται) to assist
Leptines in defending his law (Dem. 20.146, 152, 153), whatever the differences
between the two cases and the two procedures followed.37 At what point of the pro-
cedure were they appointed? Schöll more than one century ago correctly pointed out
that the election in Athens was used only when experts were needed, and this must
be the case here.38 In our reconstruction such an observation carries even greater weight,
since, as we have seen, the preliminary vote opened the doors to any proposal, and it
was impossible before the ‘third Assembly’ to know what laws had been proposed,
and what opposing laws had therefore to be repealed. Electing the sunêgoroi at any
point before the ‘third Assembly’ would have been pointless, since it would not have
been possible to select experts on the laws to be repealed. Moreover, the very mechan-
ism of the publicity in front of the monument of the Eponymous Heroes in order to let
the Athenians make up their minds seems to be explicitly established in order to have, at
the ‘third Assembly’, candidates for the election of the sunêgoroi. To sum up, the elec-
tion of the sunêgoroi is likely to have happened at the ‘third Assembly’, together with
the appointment of the nomothetai. A provision about this was certainly contained in the
legislation on nomothesia, but it is impossible to tell whether it was part of the section
read out at §§ 20–3, or the section read out at § 33.
At this point our reconstruction of the Athenian nomothesia based on the Against
Timocrates seems to be consistent in itself and with the epigraphical material. We
need now to check it against the other Demosthenic speech written for a γραφὴ
νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον θɛῖναι: the Against Leptines.39 I will concentrate on the summary
36 Cf. L. Rubinstein, Litigation and Cooperation: Supporting Speakers in the Courts of Classical
Athens. Historia Einzelschriften 147 (Stuttgart, 2000), 44.
37 I do not discuss here the legal context of the Against Leptines, to which I plan to come back in a
further essay. For various interpretations of what happened in that case see H.J. Wolff,
‘Normenkontrolle’ und Gesetzesbegriff in der athenischen Demokratie. Untersuchungen zur graphe
paranomon, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. Hist. Klasse
1969 (Heidelberg, 1970), 35–7; I. Calabi Limentani, ‘Demosthene XX, 137: A proposito della graphe
nomon me epitedeion theinai’, Studi Biscardi 1 (1982), 357–68. Hansen (n. 14), 95–9 and (n. 2),
368–71 believes that the four sundikoi were elected with the sunêgoroi in mind. The sunêgoroi are
identified with the sundikoi also by Schöll (n. 18), 109 and Wotke RE Suppl. 8.579. Pace
Atkinson (n. 7), 110 and MacDowell (n. 2), 67.
38 He therefore athetized the final clause of the document at §§ 20–3 which set their election at the
same time as the preliminary vote, since electing experts before the proposals were published would
have been nonsense; see Schöll (n. 18), 108. Cf. also Atkinson (n. 7), 113. MacDowell (n. 2), 67
reports Schöll’s opinion, but points out that in that first Assembly the people voted on the sections
of the ‘code’ of laws, and therefore sunêgoroi could be appointed that were experts on the particular
section to revise. We have seen that there is no reason to believe that an annual approval of the ‘code’
of laws ever existed.
39 For the political context of this speech see M. Canevaro, ‘L’accusa contro Leptine: crisi econom-
ica e consensus post-bellico’, Quaderni del Dipartimento di Filologia, linguistica e tradizione classica
A. Rostagni, NS 8 (2009), 117–41.
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of the legislation on nomothesia (§§ 93–4) provided immediately after the grammateus
read out the relevant law. That is the place where Demosthenes is more likely to give a
faithful picture of the law(s) about nomothesia.
At § 93 the speaker starts his account claiming that it is clear to anyone who has lis-
tened to the text of the law how excellent are Solon’s provisions for the enactment of
new laws (ὃν τρόπον … ὁ Σόλων τοὺς νόμους ὡς καλῶς κɛλɛύɛι τιθέναι). This is con-
sistent with Dem. 24.18 (πɛρὶ τῶν μɛλλόντων τɛθήσɛσθαι νόμων) and 24 (πότɛρον
ɛἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινός): the topic of the statute is the enactment of new laws.
Demosthenes also states that opposing laws must be repealed when enacting a new
law.40 This provision is recalled at Dem. 24.32 and 34 as the main topic of the law
read out at § 33. The reasons given for this provision, mainly to avoid confusion for
the judges, are consistent in both speeches. Demosthenes then (§ 94) turns to stages
of the procedure prior to those just listed (καὶ πρὸ τούτων) and recalls that the proposals
must be first published before the Eponymous Heroes, as we know from Dem. 24.25
and 37. He then adds that the bills must be read ‘often’ in the Assembly by the gram-
mateus (καὶ τῷ γραμματɛῖ παραδοῦναι, τοῦτον δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἀναγιγνώσκɛιν,
ἵν’ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἀκούσας πολλάκις). This rule is not found in the Against Timocrates,
but is confirmed by Din. 1.42 and supplies a further detail about the procedure.
It is easy to see that this short account is coherent with the reconstruction we have
drawn from the Against Timocrates. The two accounts are consistent with each other
to provide the following rules: 1) a preliminary vote in the Assembly, at any point of
the year, had to be held in order to allow new laws to be proposed (Dem. 24.25); 2)
the new proposals had to be posted in front of the monument of the Eponymous
Heroes (Dem. 24.25; 20.94); 3) the bills had to be read out by the grammateus in
each Assembly until the appointment of the nomothetai, to allow everyone to make
up their mind (Dem. 20.94); 4) in the third Assembly after the preliminary vote, on
the basis of the bills presented, the people had to discuss the appointment of the
nomothetai and pass a decree of appointment (Dem. 24.25; 20.92); 5) presumably in
the same context expert sunêgoroi were elected to defend those laws whose repeal
was necessary for enacting the new laws (Dem. 24.36; 20.146); 6) opposing laws had
to be repealed before enacting new laws (Dem. 24.32, 34–5; Dem. 20.93); 7) if the pro-
poser of a new law failed to abide by any of these provisions, anyone could bring him to
trial through a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον θɛῖναι (Dem. 24.32).
III.1. THE DOCUMENT AT DEM. 24.20–3
I shall now examine the two laws on nomothesia inserted in the speech Against
Timocrates. The first law is found at §§ 20–3. Stichometric calculations have shown
that this document cannot have been part of the Urexemplar of the speech. Its text is
however abundantly commented on in the scholia, which shows that the document
was present in copies of the speech circulating in late antiquity.41
40 I do not discuss here the identity of the nomothetai. This, together with the procedure for repeal-
ing contradictory laws described in Demosthenes’ speech Against Leptines and Aeschines’ speech
Against Ctesiphon (3.38–40) will be the subject of a further essay.
41 If, following M. Heath, Menander: A Rhetor in Context (Oxford, 2004), 132–83, we attribute
many of these scholia to Menander, then we can at least keep the late 3rd century A.D. as a terminus
ante quem.
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ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΟΤΟΝΙΑ ΝΟΜΩΝ.
’Επὶ δὲ τῆς πρώτης πρυτανɛίας τῇ ἑνδɛκάτῃ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐπɛιδὰν ɛὔξηται ὁ κῆρυξ,
ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν ποιɛῖν τῶν νόμων, πρῶτον μὲν πɛρὶ τῶν βουλɛυτικῶν, δɛύτɛρον δὲ τῶν
κοινῶν, ɛἶτα οἳ κɛῖνται τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσιν, ɛἶτα τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. ἡ δὲ χɛιροτονία
ἔστω ἡ προτέρα, ὅτῳ δοκοῦσιν ἀρκɛῖν οἱ νόμοι οἱ βουλɛυτικοί, ἡ δ’ ὑστέρα, ὅτῳ
μὴ δοκοῦσιν· ɛἶτα τῶν κοινῶν κατὰ ταὐτά. τὴν δ’ ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν ɛἶναι τῶν νόμων κατὰ
τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κɛιμένους. ἐὰν δέ τινɛς τῶν νόμων τῶν κɛιμένων ἀποχɛιροτονηθῶσι,
τοὺς πρυτάνɛις, ἐϕ’ ὧν ἂν ἡ ἐπιχɛιροτονία γένηται, ποιɛῖν πɛρὶ τῶν ἀποχɛιροτονηθέντων
τὴν τɛλɛυταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν· τοὺς δὲ προέδρους, οἳ ἂν τυγχάνωσι προɛδρɛύοντɛς
ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, χρηματίζɛιν ἐπάναγκɛς πρῶτον μɛτὰ τὰ ἱɛρὰ πɛρὶ τῶν νομοθɛτῶν,
καθ’ ὅ τι καθɛδοῦνται, καὶ πɛρὶ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὁπόθɛν τοῖς νομοθέταις ἔσται· τοὺς δὲ
νομοθέτας ɛἶναι ἐκ τῶν ὀμωμοκότων τὸν ἡλιαστικὸν ὅρκον. ἐὰν δ’ οἱ πρυτάνɛις μὴ
ποιήσωσι κατὰ τὰ γɛγραμμένα τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἢ οἱ πρόɛδροι μὴ χρηματίσωσι κατὰ τὰ
γɛγραμμένα, ὀφɛίλɛιν τῶν μὲν πρυτάνɛων ἕκαστον χιλίας δραχμὰς ἱɛρὰς τῇ ’Αθηνᾷ, τῶν
δὲ προέδρων ἕκαστος ὀφɛιλέτω τɛτταράκοντα δραχμὰς ἱɛρὰς τῇ ’Αθηνᾷ. καὶ ἔνδɛιξις
αὐτῶν ἔστω πρὸς τοὺς θɛσμοθέτας, καθάπɛρ ἐάν τις ἄρχῃ ὀϕɛίλων τῷ δημοσίῳ· οἱ δὲ
θɛσμοθέται τοὺς ἐνδɛιχθέντας ɛἰσαγόντων ɛἰς τὸ δικαστήριον κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἢ μὴ
ἀνιόντων ɛἰς Ἄρɛιον πάγον, ὡς καταλύοντɛς τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν νόμων. πρὸ δὲ τῆς
ἐκκλησίας ὁ βουλόμɛνος ’Αθηναίων ἐκτιθέτω πρόσθɛ τῶν ἐπωνύμων γράψας τοὺς νόμους
οὓς ἂν τιθῇ, ὅπως ἂν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν τɛθέντων νόμων ψηϕίσηται ὁ δῆμος πɛρὶ τοῦ
χρόνου τοῖς νομοθέταις. ὁ δὲ τιθɛὶς τὸν καινὸν νόμον ἀναγράψας ɛἰς λɛύκωμα ἐκτιθέτω
πρόσθɛν τῶν ἐπωνύμων ὁσημέραι, ἕως ἂν ἐκκλησία γένηται. αἱρɛῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς
συναπολογησομένους τὸν δῆμον τοῖς νόμοις, οἳ ἂν ἐν τοῖς νομοθέταις λύωνται, πέντɛ
ἄνδρας ἐξ ’Αθηναίων ἁπάντων, τῇ ἑνδɛκάτῃ τοῦ ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνός.
EΠΙ ΧΕΙΡΟΤΟΝΙΑΝ S | 2 πɛρὶ del. Schoell | 2–3 πɛρὶ τῶν κοινῶν A | 3 ἡ δὲ χɛιροτονία S : ἡ
δ’ ἐπιχɛιροτονία A F Y P | ἀρχῶν susp. Dobree | 5 κοινῶν codd. : λοιπῶν Westermann :
κοινῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν Sykutris | κατὰ ταὐτά F : κατὰ αὐτά S : κατ’ αὐτά A (apostr. add.
manus secunda) | 7 ἀποχɛιροτονία A Y P (Pγρ. ἐπιχɛιροτονία) | 9 τυγχάνωσι A P Schol. ad
loc. : τύχωσι S F Y | παρɛδρɛύοντɛς S Y | 10 τοῦ om. S F Y P | 11 τὸν om. A | 12 ποιῶσι
S F Y P | κατὰ τὰ προγɛγραμμένα A F Y P | 13 κατὰ τὰ γɛγραμμένα (προγɛγραμμένα F
Y P) om. A | ὀφɛίλɛιν τῶν codd. : ὀφɛιλόντων A | 15 ἔστω αὐτῶν A | 18 ’Αθηναίων
νομοθɛτɛῖν F | 20 ἐκτɛθέντων F | 22 <ἡ> ἐκκλησία add. Dobree | 23 οἷοι A | 23–4 τῇ
ἑνδɛκάτῃ τοῦ ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνός del. Schoell cf. 26.
On the eleventh day of the first prytany in the Assembly; after the herald says the prayers, the
approval of laws shall proceed as follows: first those laws concerning the Council, second the
general ones, then those concerning the nine archons and then those of the other magistrates.
First, those satisfied with the laws about the Council will raise their hands and then those
who are not satisfied, and later in the same way they shall vote about the general statutes.
The approval of laws shall be conducted according to the existing laws. If some existing
laws are rejected, the prytaneis in whose term the voting takes place shall devote the last of
the three Assemblies to discuss the rejected laws; the chairmen of this Assembly shall, immedi-
ately after the religious observances, put the question about the sessions of nomothetai and the
fund from which their payment is to be drawn. Only persons who have sworn the judicial oath
can be appointed as nomothetai. If the prytaneis do not convene the Assembly as above or the
chairmen do not put the question in discussion, each prytanis shall owe a thousand drachmas
sacred to Athena and each chairman forty drachmas sacred to Athena. And an endeixis shall
be lodged with the thesmothetai as in the case of anyone who holds office while in debt to
the public treasury; and the thesmothetai are to introduce the cases of those against whom infor-
mation was given to the court according to the law, otherwise they are not going to become
members of the Areopagus on the ground of obstructing the rectification of the laws. Before
the day of the Assembly any Athenian who wishes may display in front of the monument of
the Eponymous Heroes the laws he proposed, in order that the Assembly may vote about the
time allowed to the nomothetai with due regard to the number of the proposed laws. Anyone
proposing a new law shall write it on a white board and display it in front of the
Eponymous Heroes as many days as remain until the day of the Assembly. The Assembly,
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on the eleventh of the month Hekatombaion, shall elect five persons from all the Athenians who
will defend the laws under repeal in front of the nomothetai.42
There are major differences between the document and Demosthenes’ accounts in
this speech and in the Against Leptines. 1) The procedure described by Demosthenes
is one for enacting new laws, whereas the document provides for an annual vote of
approval of the entire ‘code’ of laws and for the rejection of some. 2) Demosthenes
describes a preliminary vote to allow new proposals (plural) to be made whereas the
document describes a vote of approval for the existing laws section by section.
3) The document sets this vote of approval in the 11th day of the first prytany of
every year and provides, in case some laws are not approved, for the appointment of
the nomothetai following a discussion in ‘the last of the three Assemblies’.
Demosthenes, on the other hand, supported by the epigraphical evidence, shows that
the nomothetai could be appointed at any point of the year. 4) The document provides
for the election of five sunêgoroi in the same Assembly on the 11th of the first prytany.
Demosthenes, on the other hand, implies that they were appointed later after the propo-
sals for new laws were presented. A closer analysis of the features of the document con-
firms that it cannot be an authentic Athenian statute.
1) The expression ‘after the herald says the prayers’ (ἐπɛιδὰν ɛὔξηται ὁ κῆρυξ) to
indicate that a matter must be the first item on the agenda of an Assembly meeting is
unparalleled in Athenian inscriptions. The customary expression, in Athens and else-
where, was μɛτὰ τὰ ἱɛρά (‘after the sacrifices’).43
2) In the document we find the phrase ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν ποιɛῖν τῶν νόμων. The verb
ποιɛῖν is in the active, but there is no subject for it. The subject here should be the
proedroi or the people. Even if we assume that the subject is understood, the expression
is nevertheless unparalleled. In Athenian inscriptions the proedroi put to the vote
(ἐπιψηϕίζɛιν), they never ποιɛῖν χɛιροτονίαν (or words derived from the same root),
it is always the δῆμος (or the βουλή) that (ἐπι- or δια-) votes by show of hands
(χɛιροτονῆσαι).44 In literary sources the verb used with χɛιροτονίαν (or derivatives)
is invariably δίδωμι.45 It is easy to see where a later forger could find such an
expression: at § 25 Demosthenes writes καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐφ’ ὑμῖν ἐποίησαν
διαχɛιροτονίαν. However, the subject of ἐποίησαν is there οἱ νόμοι, specifically
those about nomothesia. The expression means ‘and first the laws set a vote among
you (in the Assembly)’, and in this sense is perfectly normal. The forger took it from
this context and misunderstood it.
42 This translation is adapted from I. Arnaoutoglou, Ancient Greek Laws: A Sourcebook (London,
1998), 88–9.
43 This expression is found in the document later at § 21. It was widespread in the Greek world. A
search in the PHI database yields 34 occurrences in Athenian inscriptions (e.g. IG II2 107.16; 185.8;
212.57; 238 fr. bc1.13–4), but 345 from the Aegean Islands and Crete, and 69 from Asia Minor. τὰ
ἱɛρά refers to the sacrifices, cf. Harris (n. 32), 91–2.
44 Cf. e.g. IG II2 28.14, 22–3; 211.5–6; 244.28 for the people, 244.10 for the Council.
45 Cf. for the fifth and fourth century Aeschin. 3.39; Dem. 24.50, 24.25, 22.9; and Ath. Pol. 43.5,
55.4. They confirm that the correct verb is δίδωμι. The only exception seems to be Dem. 21.6, where
we find καταχɛιροτονίαν ὁ δῆμος ἐποιήσατο. However καταχɛιροτονία in this case does not
mean simply a vote, it means a vote of censure in a probolê, even though without legal effects;
see E.M. Harris, Demosthenes. Speeches 20–22 (Austin, TX, 2008), 79. The expression therefore
does not mean, as in all the other cases, ‘to put a matter to the vote’, but to ‘condemn’. ποιɛῖν
with χɛιροτονία becomes common in later times. Cf. e.g. Plut. Nic. 12.5; Paus. Att. Att. On.
1.9; Didymus Caecus, Comm. 2.256; Lib. Orat. 15.5; Socr. Schol. Hist. 2.24, 6.14, etc.
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3) The document describes the procedure for ἐπιχɛιροτονία and orders the confir-
mation πρῶτον μὲν πɛρὶ τῶν βουλɛυτικῶν, δɛύτɛρον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν, ɛἶτα οἳ κɛῖνται
τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσιν, ɛἶτα τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. Scholars have seen in these categories
the organization of the Athenian ‘code’ of laws. Laws would have been grouped in
these broad categories, in the Stoa Basileios or in the archives, according to the offi-
cial responsible for them.46 The second part of the Ath. Pol. would be based on the
actual arrangement of the laws of Athens, and would confirm the content of the
document.47 MacDowell has also, accordingly, argued that if the laws were arranged
according to the officials in charge of them, then the category τῶν κοινῶν cannot
refer to laws common to all citizens, but must refer to laws common to all the
officials.
This is not the place to discuss the hypothesis of a ‘code’ of laws arranged by the
names of the competent officials. I shall limit myself to pointing out a few difficulties
in the text of the document. First, the grammar of the clause does not work: the clause
ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν ποιɛῖν τῶν νόμων requires a genitive of the categories, and πɛρὶ τῶν
βουλɛυτικῶν (‘make a vote of confirmation about the laws about the bouleutic
[sc. laws]’) as it stands does not make any sense.48 Moreover τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν as it
stands recalls the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν ἀρχῶν, a procedure that has nothing to do with
an approval of the Athenian ‘code of laws’, and is, unlike this procedure, well attested
(cf. Ath. Pol. 43.4, 61.2 and 61.4 and [Dem.] 58.27). Schöll, in order to save the
provision, proposes that τῶν ἀρχῶν is haplography for τῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν.
A second difficulty is in the next sentence (ἡ δὲ χɛιροτονία ἔστω ἡ προτέρα, ὅτῳ
δοκοῦσιν ἀρκɛῖν οἱ νόμοι οἱ βουλɛυτικοί, ἡ δ’ ὑστέρα, ὅτῳ μὴ δοκοῦσιν· ɛἶτα τῶν
κοινῶν κατὰ ταὐτά). The document spells out the procedure of approval, but stops
with the ‘common laws’ and does not say anything about the last two categories.
Their absence from the description of the actual procedure points to an interpretation
of the last categories not as subdivisions of the ‘code’ of laws, but rather as an actual
ἐπιχɛιροτονία of the officials, which has nothing to do with the legislation on
nomothesia.49
The third difficulty is that later in the document we read that ἐὰν δέ τινɛς τῶν
νόμων τῶν κɛιμένων ἀποχɛιροτονηθῶσι (‘if some existing laws are rejected’), a
later Assembly must discuss the appointment of the nomothetai πɛρὶ τῶν
ἀποχɛιροτονηθέντων. This passage refers to actual laws rejected in the annual vote
of approval, but the document provides only for approval of macro-sections of the
‘code’. When and how ‘were some of the existing laws rejected’ (τινɛς τῶν νόμων
τῶν κɛιμένων ἀποχɛιροτονηθῶσι)? One might argue that the Athenians voted on
every single law section by section, but this would have taken far longer than one meet-
ing of the Assembly. A further, general difficulty in accepting a vote kapitelweise is that
46 Cf. Schöll (n. 18), 85–95; U. Kahrstedt, ‘Die Nomotheten und die Legislative in Athen’, Klio 31
(1938), 1–25, at 11; E. Ruschenbusch, Solonos nomoi: die Fragmente des solonischen Gesetzeswerkes
mit einer Text und Überlieferungsgeschichte (Wiesbaden, 1966), 27–31; MacDowell (n. 2), 67;
Rhodes (n. 24), 33–9; J.P. Sickinger, Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens (Chapel
Hill and London, 1999), 149–50.
47 Cf. the essays cited in the note above and in particular Rhodes (n. 24), 33–4. Such a correspon-
dence is not beyond doubt. For the arrangement of the second part of the Ath. Pol. see also M.H.
Hansen, The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action
against Unconstitutional Proposals (Odense, 1974), 10–12 and Harris (n. 32), 30–2.
48 Schöll (n. 18), 86, in order to save the provision, has athetized πɛρί.
49 This was already noted by Westermann (n. 16), 14.
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we never find in our sources, either literary or epigraphic, any mention of such cat-
egories. If these categories were listed and spelt out every year in the Assembly, we
would expect the Athenians to be generally aware of them, and the orators to refer to
them in order to make the statutes mentioned easily recognized. Instead, we find
νόμους τɛλωνικούς (Dem. 24.101), φονικοὺς νόμους (Dem. 23.51), a μɛταλλικὸν
νόμον (Dem. 37.35), ἐμπορικοὺς νόμους (Dem. 35.3), πɛρὶ διαθηκῶν νόμους
(Hyp. 3.17), a πɛρὶ τῆς κακηγορίας νόμον (Isoc. 20.3), a πɛρὶ τῆς ἀργίας νόμον
(Dem. 57.32), but never a single mention of any of the categories found in the
document.50
4) The next clause in the document, τὴν δ’ ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν ɛἶναι τῶν νόμων κατὰ
τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κɛιμένους, is otiose. The document purports to report the statute
about the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων, and it lays down the procedure for approval.
Thus there is no point in providing that the vote of approval is given κατὰ τοὺς
νόμους τοὺς κɛιμένους: either there were no pre-existing laws on the topic, or the
new procedure overrode them. The rule therefore makes no sense.51
5) The next sentence provides that in case any of the laws is rejected, the prytaneis
must schedule the discussion of the rejected laws τὴν τɛλɛυταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν.
Such an expression (or similar) is unparalleled in Athenian inscriptions and has troubled
many scholars. Its meaning seems to be clear: it specifies a total of three Assemblies that
were held, presumably, every prytany, and prescribes that discussion on the rejected
laws must be scheduled for the third of these meetings in the first prytany. Ath. Pol.
43.3, however, clearly states: οἱ δὲ πρυτανɛύοντɛς … συνάγουσιν … τὸν δὲ δῆμον
τɛτράκις τῆς πρυτανɛίας ἑκάστης. Hansen and Mitchel52 have proposed that the system
of four meetings of the Assembly every prytany must be dated later than this speech, as
late as about 350 B.C.E., and previously, in accordance with the document, there were
only three meetings per prytany. Demosthenes (24.25) however states that the discus-
sion about the appointment of the nomothetai must be held τὴν τρίτην …
ἐκκλησίαν. Schöll53 rightly noted that in Athenian inscriptions ɛἰς τὴν πρώτην
ἐκκλησίαν always refers to the following Assembly (e.g. IG II2 103, line 14) and there-
fore τὴν τρίτην … ἐκκλησίαν must refer to the third Assembly after the first one. This
would confirm the figure of four Assemblies per prytany provided by the pseudo-
Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians.
Hansen tries to refute Schöll’s argument by pointing out that the Greeks usually
counted inclusively, and the fact that τὴν πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν means ‘the following
Assembly’ does not prove that τὴν δɛυτέραν ἐκκλησίαν means ‘the second
Assembly’ after the original one. I doubt whether such an ambiguity would have
been acceptable in official language: if Hansen is right, ideally it would have been poss-
ible to refer to the ‘following Assembly’ both with τὴν πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν and τὴν
δɛυτέραν ἐκκλησίαν, and this second expression would have meant both ‘the following
Assembly’ and ‘the second Assembly’ after the original one. No evidence supports this
implausible hypothesis. Moreover at Dem. 20.94 we read that the bills had to be read
50 E.M. Harris, ‘What are the laws of Athens about? Substance and procedure in Athenian statutes’,
Dike 12/13 (2009/10), 5–67 provides more examples and shows that Athenian laws were organized
not by procedure but by substantive content.
51 The same remarks have been made by Westermann (n. 16), 19 and Schöll (n. 18), 99–100.
52 M.H. Hansen and F. Mitchel, ‘The number of ecclesiai in fourth-century Athens’, SO 59 (1984),
13–19.
53 Schöll (n. 18), 101.
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many times (πολλάκις) in the Assembly. One could not call one meeting of the
Assembly, or even two, ‘many times’. It would require at least three meetings.
Moreover Din. 1.42 states that Demosthenes μɛτέγραφɛ καὶ μɛτɛσκɛύαζɛ τὸν νόμον
(his trierarchic law) καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν. Again, I find it hard to believe that
ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν can refer to one, or even two (it would have been ἑκατέραν) meet-
ings of the Assembly. Hansen counters this argument claiming that in the first case the
procedure was probably a different one, and in the second the number of Assemblies per
prytany had already been changed. This begs the question. Demosthenes’ wording
clearly points to ‘the third Assembly’ after the original one. The document is clearly
in disagreement with the orator. Schöll tried to solve this difficulty by hypothesizing
that τὴν τɛλɛυταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν might mean ‘the last of the three (remaining)
Assemblies’. But this interpretation strains the Greek and is less satisfactory than the
straightforward reading of the phrase.
However an alternative solution exists. If we look at the scholia to this passage
(Σ Dem. 24.20 Dilts) we read κατὰ μῆνα τρɛῖς ἐκκλησίας ἐποιοῦντο, and then a
list of typical days for Assemblies that is confirmed by the epigraphical evidence.54
This piece of information is found also in Σ Dem. 18.73, 19.123, 154 Dilts,
Σ Aesch. 1.60, 3.24 Schultz, Σ Ar. Ach. 19, Phot. s.v. κυρία ἐκκλησία. All these
texts are likely to derive from an independent source which was, as the wide spread
of attestations show, well known from at least the second century A.D.
(Harpocration, s.v. σύγκλητος ἐκκλησία provides the terminus ante quem). A later
forger, independently aware of this piece of information and faced with τὴν τρίτην
… ἐκκλησίαν in Demosthenes’ account might easily have concluded that the orator
was referring to the third Assembly of the month. Yet this is not what Demosthenes
says. He states that the discussion about the appointment of the nomothetai is to
take place at the third meeting of the Assembly after the initial vote to allow new legis-
lation, no sooner, no later.
6) The date at the beginning of the document is given according to the bouleutic
calendar, whereas at the end we find ‘on the eleventh of the month Hekatombaion’,
which follows the festival calendar. However in the fourth century we never find in
inscriptions the date expressed according to the festival calendar before 341/0.55 This
law, if authentic, would have been enacted at the end of the fifth or at the beginning
of the fourth century. The speech itself dates from the 350s. The presence of a date
expressed according to the festival calendar is unacceptable.56
7) There follows a long section about the penalties for prytaneis, proedroi and thes-
mothetai who do not perform their duties. Afterwards the document requires that copies
of the proposals be placed before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes, in order to
allow the people to assess the time needed by the nomothetai and appoint them accord-
ingly. The last provision deals with the election (αἱρɛῖσθαι) of advocates of the laws to
be repealed (τοὺς συναπολογησομένους τοῖς νόμοις). We have seen above that the
rationale for the election of advocates of the laws would require them to be chosen
54 E. M. Harris, ‘When Did the Athenian Assembly Meet? Some New Evidence’, AJPh 112 (1991),
325–41. M. H. Hansen, ‘How often did the Athenian Assembly meet? A reply’, GRBS 28 (1987),
35–50 claims that the information applies only to the period of the twelve tribes but see Harris
(n. 32), 118–120.
55 IG II2 229.4–5. Cf. A. Henry, The Prescripts of Athenian Decrees (= Mnemosyne Suppl. 44)
(Leiden, 1977), 37.
56 Harris (n. 32), 104 n. 5; M.H. Hansen, ‘Was the Athenian ekklesia convened according to the
festival calendar or the Bouleutic calendar?’, AJPh 114 (1993), 99–113, at 101–2.
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when the laws to be repealed are known, that is ‘in the third Assembly’. One could not
know what opposing laws (if any) were to be repealed until after the proposals for new
laws were made at subsequent meetings of the Assembly.57 In the document they are
nevertheless appointed τῇ ἑνδɛκάτῃ τοῦ ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνός. Schöll, in order to
solve this problem, has proposed to athetize the indication of the date. Such an emendation
is not acceptable unless the document’s authenticity can be independently confirmed.
8) Demosthenes at § 36 calls the advocates of a law συνηγόρους. At Dem. 20.146 he
calls them σύνδικοι. Both these terms are attested in contemporary Athenian inscrip-
tions.58 Instead, the participle συναπολογησομένους or any other form of the verb
συναπολογέομαι are unattested in Attic inscriptions. The two words employed by
Demosthenes are technical terms, yet the participle in the document, where we should
expect official language, is not.59
To sum up. The person who composed the document at Dem. 24.20–23 was a skilful
forger, one who knew the Attic orators and possibly had access to a lexicon or commen-
tary. Whatever he knew, the document is not consistent with Demosthenes’ accounts in
Against Leptines and Against Timocrates and contains features which find no parallel in
contemporary documents or betray the composer’s misinterpretation of his sources.
III.2. THE DOCUMENT AT DEM. 24.33
The stichometry shows that this document was also not present in the Urexemplar of the
speech.60 The scholia provide comments on the document, which show that it was pre-
sent in manuscripts circulating in late antiquity.
ΝΟΜΟΣ.
Τῶν δὲ νόμων τῶν κɛιμένων μὴ ἐξɛῖναι λῦσαι μηδένα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν νομοθέταις. τότɛ δ’ ἐξɛῖναι
τῷ βουλομένῳ ’Αθηναίων λύɛιν, ἕτɛρον τιθέντι ἀνθ’ ὅτου ἂν λύῃ. διαχɛιροτονίαν δὲ ποιɛῖν
τοὺς προέδρους πɛρὶ τούτων τῶν νόμων, πρῶτον μὲν πɛρὶ τοῦ κɛιμένου, ɛἰ δοκɛῖ ἐπιτήδɛιος
ɛἶναι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ ’Αθηναίων ἢ οὔ, ἔπɛιτα πɛρὶ τοῦ τιθɛμένου. ὁπότɛρον δ’ ἂν χɛιροτονήσωσιν
οἱ νομοθέται, τοῦτον κύριον ɛἶναι. ἐναντίον δὲ νόμον μὴ ἐξɛῖναι τιθέναι τῶν νόμων τῶν
κɛιμένων μηδɛνί. ἐὰν δέ τις λύσας τινὰ τῶν νόμων τῶν κɛιμένων ἕτɛρον ἀντιθῇ μὴ
ἐπιτήδɛιον τῷ δήμῳ τῷ ’Αθηναίων ἢ ἐναντίον τῶν κɛιμένων τῳ, τὰς γραϕὰς ɛἶναι κατ’
αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ὃς κɛῖται ἐάν τις μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον θῇ νόμον.
4 τῷ ’Αθηναίων codd. : τῷ ’Αθηναίῳ S | 5 τοῦτον τὸν κύριον S | 6–7 μηδɛνί – κɛιμένων om. P
add. in marg. | 7 ἀντιθῇ codd. : ἀντιτιθῇ Sc (m.a.) | 8 ἢ om. Sa |
It is prohibited to repeal any existing law except at a session of nomothetai. And then, any
Athenian who wishes to repeal a law, shall propose a new law to replace the one repealed.
And the chairmen shall take a vote by showing of hands about those laws, first about the
57 Cf. above, pp. 144–7.
58 σύνδικος is found in inscriptions up to the end of the fourth century in SEG 3.117.7; 42.217.8–9;
GRBS 26:165.49.5; 51.17. συνήγορος is found in IG II2 1183.14; 1237.32; 1251.10–1; III App. 38.6–7;
E. Ziebarth, Neue Verfluchungstafeln, SPAW 1 (1934), 2.2; SEG 44.226.6, 10; 28.103.41–2. For differ-
ences between the two terms, and the overlap in their application see Rubinstein (n. 36), 43–5.
59 Participles of συναπολογέομαι are found in fourth-century prose only at Dem. 25.56; Hyp. 1.10;
Lycurg. 138. They are never employed as technical terms but simply mean ‘one who joins in mount-
ing one’s defence’. It is also interesting that the verb is found in the Demosthenic corpus only in two
other places: Dem. 24.157, 159, both in the same speech where we find the document.
60 Cf. Burger (n. 17), 14.
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existing one, if it seems that the law is advantageous to the Athenians or not, and then about the
proposed one. The law which the nomothetai vote for shall be the valid one. It is not allowed to
introduce a law in conflict with existing laws, and if anyone, having repealed an existing law,
proposes a new law not advantageous for the Athenians or in conflict with any of the existing
laws, indictments shall be lodged against him according to the existing law regarding the pro-
poser of an unsuitable law.61
Demosthenes, both in his adjacent summary (§§ 32–5) and in his summary of the law
about nomothesia in the Against Leptines (Dem. 20.93–4), clearly states that the statute
supposed to be read here by the grammateus ordered that those who proposed new laws
according to the procedure previously described had to propose the repeal of any contra-
dictory law. If they failed to do so, they were liable to a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον
θɛῖναι. This document instead provides a procedure for repealing existing laws to
which Demosthenes never refers, and orders that those who repeal a law have to propose
a new law in its place. This reverses the order of the procedure’s steps in Demosthenes’
paraphrase. If the law proposed to replace the existing law contradicted existing statutes,
the repeal of those laws had to be proposed too. This procedure has nothing to do with
the straightforward provisions summarized by Demosthenes.
The document is moreover inconsistent in itself, and some of its features reveal that it
cannot be a genuine document.
1) The document contradicts itself: in its first sentence it states that ‘it is prohibited to
repeal any existing law except at a session of nomothetai’,62 but in its last sentence it
provides a different way to do it, through a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον θɛῖναι,
which had to be heard by judges, not nomothetai. That a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον
θɛῖναι, if successful, resulted in the repeal of the law enacted by the defendant is wit-
nessed by the very existence of the speeches Against Timocrates and Against Leptines.
In fact, we know that the charge brought by Apsephion was successful and resulted in
the repeal of Leptines’ law.63 Both cases were heard by judges, not by a panel of
nomothetai.64
2) The sentence ‘the chairmen shall take a vote by showing of hands about those
laws’ (διαχɛιροτονίαν δὲ ποιɛῖν τοὺς προέδρους πɛρὶ τούτων τῶν νόμων) is unparal-
leled. In all our sources the proedroi always give (διδόναι) a διαχɛιροτονίαν. This
expression derives, again, from § 25 (καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐφ’ ὑμῖν ἐποίησαν
διαχɛιροτονίαν: ‘and first the laws set a vote among you’) where, however, the subject
was the laws on nomothesia.
61 This translation is adapted from Arnaoutoglou (n. 42), 89–91.
62 The forger might have been misled by Dem. 3.10. This passage mentions the possibility of
appointing nomothetai for the sole purpose of repealing laws, but his language makes it clear that
their normal function was to ratify laws and that his own proposal would have been an innovation.
63 See Dio Chrys. 31.128 with Harris (n. 45), 20–1.
64 The orator addresses the audience with the words ἄνδρɛς δικασταί at Dem. 20.1, 15, 29, 36, 45,
55, 64, 67, 69, 79, 87, 95; 24.1, 19, 24, 43, 51, 64, 72, 111, 113, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 130, 134,
136, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 151, 152, 153, 154, 167, 200, 212. Hansen (n. 2), 350
postulates that during the first year after its enactment a law was not fully in force, but had an inter-
mediate status, and could be repealed in a tribunal. After one year it became one τῶν δὲ νόμων τῶν
κɛιμένων, a part of the ‘code’, and could be repealed only by the nomothetai. This seems to me to
explain ignotum per ignotius. This intermediate status is clearly excluded by the law of Diocles,
quoted and discussed at Dem. 24.42–4, which states that τοὺς νόμους … τοὺς δὲ μɛτ᾽ Εὐκλɛίδην
τɛθέντας καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τιθɛμένους κυρίους ɛἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη. This document
there inserted was, according to the stichometry, part of the Urexemplar, and M.H. Hansen, ‘Diokles’
law (Dem. XVI 42) and the revision of the Athenian corpus of laws in the archonship of Eukleides’,
C&M 41 (1990), 63–71 accepts it as an authentic statute.
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3) At § 32 Demosthenes states that the law about to be read by the grammateus, in
case someone enacts a law in contrast with existing statutes, γράφɛσθαι κɛλɛύɛι. This
expression means that the law permits anyone to bring a public action and lays down the
procedure for it.65 The document on the other hand does not lay down any procedure,
but states that if one enacts a law in contrast with existing statutes and does not repeal
them, the γραφαί ‘shall be lodged against him according to the existing law regarding
the proposer of an unsuitable law’. Instead of describing the proper procedure, the docu-
ment refers to a further law: τὸν νόμον ὃς κɛῖται ἐάν τις μὴ ἐπιτήδɛιον θῇ νόμον.
To sum up, the provisions described in this document are quite inconsistent
with Demosthenes’ accounts of nomothesia in the Against Leptines and Against
Timocrates. They are also contradictory, and one phrase finds no parallel in contempor-
ary inscriptions. Moreover there is no reason to believe that the additional information
found in the inserted document that is not found in the accompanying summary derives
from an independent source and is reliable. The disagreements between the document
and the orator’s account can be more likely explained as due to clumsy composition
from the orator’s words.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This essay has shown that the documents found at Dem. 24.20–3 and 33 are later inser-
tions and do not provide genuine texts of the original statutes, not even ones heavily
corrupted in the process of transmission. They are instead very early attempts to recon-
struct the procedure discussed by Demosthenes in these speeches and to fill in their gaps
from information found in other speeches (and possibly some other sources), but marred
by errors and misunderstandings.
I have reconstructed the procedure of nomothesia from the mutually consistent
accounts found in Demosthenes’ speeches Against Leptines and Against Timocrates,
which are confirmed in some respects by contemporary epigraphical evidence. The pro-
cedure began in the Assembly with a vote on whether to allow new proposals. This
meeting could take place at any time during the year. Afterwards any proposal had to
be posted before the statues of the Eponymous Heroes and read out at several meetings
of the Assembly. Before enacting a new law, opposing laws had to be repealed. In the
third Assembly meeting after the preliminary vote the people passed a decree of appoint-
ment for the nomothetai and elected sunêgoroi to defend the opposing laws. If any of
these rules was ignored, anyone could prosecute the proposer on a public charge of
enacting an inexpedient law (graphê nomon mê epitêdeion theinai).
This procedure fits well into the context of the revision of the laws of Solon and of
the laws about legislation passed at the end of the fifth century. The revision of the laws
of Solon started in 410/9. Anagrapheis were appointed to find the relevant laws and sub-
mit them to the Assembly for approval. The approved laws had to be reinscribed on ste-
lae placed in front of the Royal Stoa. The procedure was interrupted during the regime
of the Thirty but resumed after the restoration of the democracy and was completed by
399. At this stage, the Athenians also enacted new statutes defining precisely what a law
65 Cf. Dem. 29.9 with MacDowell (n. 32), 257–72 and id. (n. 21), 46–7. Demosthenes obviously
does not mean that the law ‘orders’ the prosecution of the law’s proposer.
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is, how it differs from a decree, and made explicit that laws are always superior to
decrees.66
The common purpose of these measures was to put some order in the mass of the
Assembly’s enactments, providing a hierarchy among them and eliminating contradic-
tion between statutes. The aim of these reforms was to strengthen the rule of law by
improving the internal consistency of the legal system, and thus securing for litigants
consistency and predictability in the verdicts of the courts.67 The coherence of the
legal system, however, had to be protected from unscrupulous changes. After all, in
411 democracy itself had been ‘legally’ abrogated through simple enactments of the
Assembly. The approval by the Assembly could no longer suffice to legislate.
Therefore it is only natural to date the introduction of the new procedure of nomothesia
in the context of the revision of the Solonian laws, together with the clear definition of
what a law is and how it differs from a decree.68
My reconstruction of fourth-century nomothesia shows how the Athenians devised a
procedure for enacting new legislation whose purpose was not only the careful examin-
ation of new proposals, but also an assessment of their consistency with existing
measures, and with the legal system as a whole. The speeches Against Timocrates
and Against Leptines show that the arguments employed for repealing laws not only
included an analysis of their effects on the public good but also addressed the issue
of their consistency with other statutes on the same topic. An accuser might also
argue that the law he was indicting conflicted with the alleged intent of the lawgiver
as it could be discovered in other statutes.69 In the speech Against Timocrates, at §§
41–67, we find a long list of laws and a discussion of how the law of Timocrates clashes
with their provisions. At § 35 the speaker explicitly states that if there are two contra-
dictory laws, the judges cannot possibly vote according to their oath, since by following
one law they would break the other one. In the speech Against Leptines at §§ 102–4
Demosthenes states that the aim and spirit of the law of Leptines contradicts the aim
and spirit of another ancient and revered law, whose author was Solon. The proposed
law must therefore be consistent both with the terms of other laws and with the overall
aims of the legal system as a whole. Similar arguments must have been key in the
debates about enacting new laws.
In the fourth century the Athenians added further procedures to preserve the internal
coherence of their laws: they appointed commissioners to inspect the existing laws to
find contradictions (Dem. 20.91) and provided that the same control over the existing
laws should be performed by the thesmothetai (Aeschin. 3.38–9).70 These measures
were intended to remove the inconsistencies in the laws that occurred in spite of the
new procedure for nomothesia. The law of Nicophon (SEG 26.72, lines 55–6) of
66 Cf. Canevaro and Harris (n. 1), 110–13, 116–19.
67 Cf. J. Sickinger, ‘Indeterminacy in Greek law: statutory gaps and conflicts’, in E. Harris and
G. Thür (edd.), Symposion 2007: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte
(Vienna, 2008), 99–112.
68 A.R.W. Harrison, ‘Law-making at Athens at the end of the fifth century B.C.’, JHS 75 (1955),
26–35 argued extensively for this date, and has generally been endorsed. See e.g. MacDowell
(n. 2), 62; Rhodes (n. 1), 12–16; and M. Gagarin, Writing Greek Law (Cambridge, 2008), 185–8.
69 For a discussion of the arguments from the intent of the lawgiver see E.M. Harris, ‘Did the
Athenian courts attempt to achieve consistency? Oral tradition and written records in the Athenian
administration of justice’, in C. Cooper (ed.), Politics of Orality (Leiden, 2007), 343–70, at 365–7.
70 Cf. above, p. 139 n. 2.
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375/4 shows that the texts of contradictory laws were actually destroyed when new
measures were enacted.71
In fact, the Athenians in the fourth century clearly envisaged each law to form part of
a coherent whole, and often argued their cases taking such consistency as a given.72
Aeschines (3.37–40) goes so far as to claim that, because there were procedures in
place to ensure the internal coherence of the legal system, it was impossible for two con-
tradictory laws about the awarding of crowns to be valid at the same time. The existence
of a procedure like nomothesia in Athens is evidence that the Athenians not only had a
clear understanding of the importance of a coherent system of laws for the city. They
also took practical steps to achieve it.73
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71 Cf. Sickinger (n. 67), 107 about this aspect of the law of Nicophon. Pace A. Lanni, Law and
Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens (Cambridge and New York, 2006), 115–48: Lanni’s conten-
tion that the Athenians showed little regard for consistency in their legal system is untenable.
72 Cf. for this attitude in the orators Harris (n. 69).
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